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The Establishment Clause in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution has been the 
subject of contentious debate. Advocates for a strict separation of church and state believe that it 
should be broadly interpreted, while critics think that it should be interpreted narrowly. The U.S. 
Supreme Court invented the Lemon test in its decision in Lemon vs. Kurtzman (1971) in order to 
provide clear guidance for establishment clause cases. The Lemon test set the standard for 
determining government entanglement with religion for over a decade after its creation. However, 
beginning in the 1980s, arguments that the test provided an overly broad interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause began to impact its use. The Lemon test’s absence has led to Supreme Court 
decisions that have slowly eroded the wall of separation between church and state. Justices have 
tried to create new tests, but they have been unable to replicate the success of Lemon. 
Justices have increasingly relied on subjective reasoning that has contradicted past 
precedent and further obscured the boundary between church and state. Their conflicting 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause have created questions about their abilities as decision 
makers. Justices’ personal biases and ideological differences can create errors in judgment thus 
having the potential to influence their decisions, making tests, like Lemon, essential for 
interpreting the Constitution. The Lemon test provides a clear and concise method that is essential 
for ensuring that the government and the Supreme Court adhere to a strict set of rules for 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Analysis of the Court’s decision making in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman (1971), Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Lee v. Weisman (1992) highlights the strength 
of the Lemon test when it is used and reveals the shortcomings of Establishment Clause 
interpretation without it. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) established a comprehensive 
approach for the Justices to use in Establishment Clause cases. The Court ruled 8-1 that 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island violated the First Amendment by providing public funds to private 
religious schools.1 The Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, devised a three-prong approach to 
determine if the states violated the Clause. The first prong of the test held that a statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; the second, “the principle or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion;” and third, “the statute must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”2 Burger relied heavily on the third prong of the test when delivering 
the majority opinion. In his analysis he found that since the teachers were employed by religious 
organizations and were a part of a system that placed religious ideas in the minds of children, a 
teacher would find it difficult to navigate the line between secular and religious intent.3 In order to 
prevent an excessive entanglement of church and state, both state governments would be forced to 
oversee the schools to make sure teachers did not incorporate religious ideas into the curriculum.   
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The lone dissenting opinion of Justice Byron R. White was influenced by his personal 
beliefs and highlights the errors in judgment that the Lemon test was created to prevent. White 
found fault in the Court’s decision to strike down the Rhode Island statute because he believed no 
evidence existed that teachers engaged in non-secular activities with their students.4 His reasoning 
is misguided because over two-thirds of the teachers were Catholic nuns and religious instruction 
was permitted.5 Even if secular teachings were a part of the curriculum, the schools were still 
sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church, which promotes learning through religious doctrine. 
Justice White continued his opinion by stating that he “cannot hold that the First Amendment 
forbids an agreement between the school and the State that state funds would be used only to teach 
secular subjects.”6 White’s subjective interpretation came into complete conflict with the 
Establishment Clause. The Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes violated the First Amendment 
because the laws respected a religious establishment. White’s flawed opinion emphasizes how 
incorporating a structured test, like Lemon, is essential for preventing a Justice’s personal bias 
from influencing his or her interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 
Despite the Lemon test’s effectiveness at countering the partiality of some Supreme Court 
Justices, critics believe that the test is flawed. Law author William B. Petersen argues that one of 
the biggest pitfalls of the test is “its assumption that a religious purpose, by itself, renders a statute 
unconstitutional.”7 He proposes that if a law is passed that has a religious purpose, it should not 
automatically be deemed unconstitutional because religious purpose does not necessarily lead to 
religious effect. Peterson exemplifies his point by suggesting that laws against murder and theft 
should be unconstitutional because those ideas are found in religious holy books.8 Peterson’s 
reasoning is flawed since laws against murder and theft have been included in secular governments 
prior to the creation of any popular holy texts. Religious organizations certainly do not hold a 
monopoly on human morality.  
Peterson’s argument misses the importance of the Lemon test’s religious purpose prong by 
overlooking the implications of a statute that supports the purpose of one religion over another. If 
a law is passed with the purpose of favoring one religion, it infringes on the First Amendment 
rights of those that practice all others. The design of the Lemon test not only prevents entanglement 
with church and state, it stops religious organizations from influencing what should be a secular 
government open to all religions. Contrary to the belief of some critics, the Lemon test does not 
restrict religious freedom. The test defends the free exercise of religion by ensuring a single 
religious faith is not valued over others. The test is extremely important for finding distinctions 
between purpose and effect, especially when the religious rights of all faiths are on the playing 
field. Failure to do so can result in Supreme Court decisions that are decided based on biased 
opinions, rather than on a structured test that arrives at an objective conclusion. 
In Marsh v. Chambers (1983) the Court did not use the Lemon test, and their decision 
emphasizes the problems that arise from not using it in establishment clause cases. The question 
laid out before the court asked if the State of Nebraska violated the Establishment Clause by paying 
a chaplain to lead a prayer before a legislative session. In a 6-3 decision the Court ruled that it did 
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not. In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote that “The opening of sessions of legislative and 
other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this 
country.”9 Burger stresses that because chaplains opening legislative sessions with prayer has been 
an historically integral part of the United States, it does not violate the Establishment Clause. He 
concludes that “this unique history led us to accept the interpretation of the First Amendment 
draftsman who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer 
similar to that now challenged.”10 Burger’s conclusion was not based on the Constitution and 
instead relied on his subjective interpretation of the country’s history.  
Both Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined together in dissent 
against the Court’s opinion and found that the ruling was in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
In his dissent, Brennan declared that “every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years,” which the Court did not do.11 
Chief Justice Burger and the other concurring Justices completely ignored using the Lemon Test 
when forming their decisions and instead relied on historical context. Since Congressional 
Chaplaincies have been a part of the legislative process for much of the history of the United States, 
they believed that they did not violate the First Amendment. 
 Analysis of relevant past Supreme Court decisions is important because it provides helpful 
context that Justices can use to formulate their own opinions. Completely ignoring the Lemon test 
led to the possibility of setting a precedent where past decisions no longer matter. In regard to the 
practice of legislatures hiring chaplains, if the Court decided to make use of the Lemon Test, 
Justice Brennan asserted that “it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of the 
Establishment Clause.”12 Brennan’s conclusion emphasizes the need for the Court to use a 
structured test like Lemon when forming their opinions. 
The Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers relied on questionable reasoning that created 
new precedent against the Establishment Clause. Legal scholar Jeremy G. Mallory notes that the 
chaplain appointed for prayer in Chambers was from one religious denomination, payment for the 
chaplain came from public funds and no analysis of what the prayers said was conducted.13 If the 
Lemon test was used, all three of these points would have shown a clear violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Chief Justice Burger’s use of historical context to justify legislative prayer 
contains serious faults. The fact that chaplains have led prayers since the founding of the United 
States does not mean it is protected by the Constitution. Using the same reasoning, one could 
defend the constitutionality of slavery by arguing that it was a historically long-standing tradition 
since the establishment of the country. Even though slaves were an American tradition it does not 
make their use moral or constitutional. Suggesting that tradition holds more importance than the 
Constitutional misses the whole reason for the document in the first place. 
The Court’s decision in Chambers incorrectly held legislative chaplaincies as an exception 
to the First Amendment. Chaplains engaging with politicians during legislative sessions clearly 
demonstrates an interaction between church and state. Mallory asserted that a distinction should 
be made between situated and rotating chaplains. He wrote that the situated chaplain in Marsh was 
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reappointed for good job performance, leading the Supreme Court to believe that, “there was no 
impermissible motive involved in his sixteen year tenure.”14 In contrast, a rotating chaplain had 
less of an established relationship with the legislative body and had “less incentive to deal with the 
pluralistic nature of [the] congregation.”15 The degree to which a situated or rotating chaplain had 
the potential to violate the Establishment Clause is insignificant when the very act of incorporating 
a spokesperson for any religion into the legislative process violates the Constitution. A chaplain 
that associates with the legislative process, even indirectly, threatens secular government. Arguing 
that legislators who reappoint a chaplain due to his secular tendencies should only raise questions, 
not answers.  
In Lee v. Weisman (1992) the Supreme Court left out the Lemon test again in favor of a 
Coercion test. The Court considered whether conducting prayer during a high school graduation 
is constitutional. In a 5-4 decision the Justices ruled that religious exercise at the graduation service 
did in fact violate the Establishment Clause. The principal of the school provided a copy of 
guidelines that the rabbi had to follow in an effort to make his prayers nonsectarian.16 Justice 
Kennedy argued that because the principal was an employee of the state, he violated the 
Establishment Clause by controlling the religious content of the prayer, even if it was in an attempt 
to be secular. Kennedy wrote that “the undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and 
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on 
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation 
and Benediction.”17 Kennedy feared that students would be coerced to participate in a religious 
practice even if went against their own beliefs. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Scalia, White and Thomas dissented against 
the Court’s opinion and its argument of coercive intent. Scalia believed that the Court’s opinion 
was flawed because it relied too heavily on the idea of coercion violating the Establishment 
Clause.18 In his dissent he wrote that “The Court's argument that state officials have ‘coerced’ 
students to take part in the invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies is, not to put too 
fine a point on it, incoherent.”19 The use of coercion relies on slippery slope reasoning because it 
is largely based on assumption and not on hard evidence.  
Legal scholar Suzanna Sherry correctly points out the issues that the Court ran into by 
ignoring the Lemon test. She writes that, “the majority opinion relied entirely on the coercive 
aspect of the setting; he [Justice Kennedy] cobbled together a majority by studiously ignoring 
Lemon.”20 Unlike the Lemon test, a test for coercion is based on a Justice’s subjective 
interpretation that can be influenced by personal bias. Sherry argues that adopting the coercion test 
narrowed interpretation of the Establishment Clause while simultaneously creating an environment 
where “equal accommodation of religion nor equal indifference to religion is mandated. Instead, 
an unrestricted majority is authorized to indulge in discriminatory preferences.”21 By substituting 
a coercion test for most of the Lemon test, the Court established further precedent that impaired 
future Establishment Clause interpretation. 
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While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was flawed, it still contained some principles of 
the Lemon test within it. Kennedy determined that the principal, as an employee of the state, 
violated the Establishment Clause by actively working to incorporate prayer into graduation. The 
State was in fact entangled with religion and violated the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 
Kennedy wrote that, “the principal chose the religious participant, here a rabbi, and that choice is 
also attributable to the State.”22 Kennedy had enough evidence to show an entanglement with 
church and state without needing to use the coercion argument. 
The cases Marsh v. Chambers (1983) and Lee v. Weisman (1992) show that the Supreme 
Court’s failure to adhere to a consistent test for determining Establishment Clause cases has further 
obscured interpretation of the First Amendment. In Chambers the Court used historical context to 
justify the employment of chaplains within state and national legislatures, thereby disregarding the 
Lemon test that would have surely found paid chaplains in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
In Weisman the Court abandoned the test again by attempting to introduce a coercive test to 
determine if prayer was constitutional. The coercive test was not an improvement over Lemon and 
instead raised more questions than answers. Even though the test could have provided clear utility 
in these cases, some Justices believed that the test was not good enough.23 Even Chief Justice 
Burger, the creator of the test has said that “Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of 
resolving every Establishment Clause issue.”24 Others think that Supreme Court decisions 
involving the Clause have become unpredictable even with the structure the test provides. Despite 
the criticism against Lemon, not using it completely has shown why a structured test is needed. 
The conflicting decisions in Marsh and Lee demonstrates the inconsistencies that arise 
when the Court rules on prayer cases without implementing Lemon. Legal Scholar Bruce P. 
Merenstein emphasizes that these two rulings created an exception for prayer in other contexts, 
such as at school board meetings. In Marsh the Supreme Court used historical context to determine 
that legislative prayer was constitutional and found school board prayer the same. Merenstein 
believes this ruling to be flawed and suggests that a decision based on historical constitutional 
analysis, fails “to acknowledge that social, cultural and material conditions change dramatically 
over decades, let alone over centuries.”25 In Lee, the Supreme Court employed the coercion test in 
its decision and used the same principles that would find school board prayer unconstitutional. 
Since these decisions still stand, the constitutionality of school board prayer is in limbo. 
Merenstein argues that “were the Court to come to the conclusion that prayer at a public-school 
board meeting is unconstitutional, it would be adhering to a half-century of consistent 
jurisprudence in the area of religion and public schools.”26 If the Lemon test had been used in both 
cases, school board prayer would certainly have been found unconstitutional. 
Studies looking at the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Establishment Clause 
cases, have shown that they have ruled consistently when using the Lemon test. Political scholar 
Joseph A. Ignagni gathered statistical data from the era of the Burger Court that displays their 
accuracy and consistency when using the Lemon test. Ignagni’s findings showed that out of the 92 
decisions the Burger Court decided, 63 were found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause 
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while 29 were not.27 Ignagni writes that, “These cases are not as conflicting, confused, or 
unpredictable as some legal scholars have claimed . . . most of the decisions can be explained and 
predicted in a consistent matter.”28 His works shows the importance of the Lemon tests as a tool 
for guiding the Justices to make accurate and correct decisions. 
A similar study conducted by Herbert M. Kritzer and Mark J. Richards analyzed cases 
involving Establishment Clause jurisprudence in an attempt to see how influential the Lemon test 
has been on the Court’s opinion deciding those cases. Kritzer and Richards tested their hypothesis 
by creating tables of data that reflect the ruling of Justices when deciding Establishment Clause 
cases ranging from Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to Mitchell v Helms (2000).  Their 
findings show that the Lemon test has “served to provide the framework for the decisions in 
Establishment Clause cases decided for over the last 30 years.”29 The framework has stayed in 
place in part because Justices have tried and failed to create a method that improves on the 
precedent the Lemon test has already established. More importantly the data shows that the Court 
has ruled consistently on Establishment Clause cases when Lemon was in use, contradicting critics 
that say the test has created an unpredictable environment for decisions involving the Clause.  
 A fundamental aspect of the Lemon test is its ability to prevent Justices from incorporating 
their own political and ideological beliefs in decisions.  As Ignagni rightly points out, a Justice is 
not prevented from “voting compatibly with his or her personal policy preferences.”30 They do not 
face the same scrutiny that elected government officials experience. They do not have to worry 
about being reelected to the Court and being accountable to voters. Therefore, Justices can make 
decisions that may not necessarily match what the greater society views as acceptable. A more 
liberal minded Court may over step its bounds and infringe on religious liberty while a more 
conservative minded court may vote in favor of upholding a decision that might entangle the state 
with religion. Legal Scholar David M. Beatty argues that “religious liberty is better protected and 
democracy more respected when judges move past the interpretive phase of the review process 
and take a close, hard look at the facts.”31 They should put their own political and personal beliefs 
in the background when interpreting the constitutionality of a case. Failure to do so can result in 
decision that is not only wrong but also hinders the jurisprudence that will be needed to decide 
cases in the future. The Lemon test is critical for ensuring that Justices follow the Constitution and 
not their personal political leanings. 
The Justices are human beings, which means that they have limitations that can impede the 
reliability of Supreme Court decisions. Psychologist and political scientist Herbert A. Simon 
conducted extensive research on the limits of human computing power and rationality. His findings 
showed that by taking into account the limitations of knowledge and power of human beings, one 
will find that they are incapable of “making objectively optimal decisions . . . but if they use 
methods of choice that are as effective as decision making and problem-solving permit, we may 
speak of procedural or bounded rationality.”32 Simon suggests through his research that human 
decision making is limited to the amount of information one knows when forming a conclusion. 
When his theory is applied to the Justices it explains how and why they have come to decisions 
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that do not always work within the context of the constitution and society as a whole. Each Justice 
comes from a different background and life experience that influences his or her decision making. 
The absence of a test that balances subjective reasoning with objective truth can be detrimental to 
Court rulings. The Lemon test is a way to counter the limits of human rationality, by incorporating 
set principles that help the Court come to a correct decision.   
The sheer volume of cases the Supreme Court takes can also hinder its opinions. Joseph A. 
Ignagni found that the case load of the Court has increased dramatically over the decades. In 1930, 
1,039 cases were docketed for the Court to hear, growing from 5,144 in 1980, all the way to 
between 7,000 and 8,000 in 2016.33 Out of the thousands of cases, the Court only hears oral 
argument for about 80 per term. Their massive workload illustrates the unrealistic expectations 
placed on the Justices. Due to the extensive case load that they preside over, their ability to remain 
impartial in decision making diminishes. It causes stress and can make Justices form conclusions 
that may not have been reached in a reasoned matter. Due to this immense burden, Ignagni believes 
that the “Justices must often rely upon a simple decision-making structure.”34 When coupled with 
Simon’s theory on the limits of human rationality, Supreme Court decisions absent of a core set of 
determined principles can inhibit the accuracy of their decisions. Ignagni emphasizes that Justices, 
“do not have the time, resources, or intellectual capacity to make all of their decisions in a more 
comprehensive manner.”35 A refined tests such as the Lemon test can help relieve the stress and 
burden placed on Justices during the decision-making process.  
In addition to providing a solid foundation for deciding Establishment Clause cases, the 
Lemon test also assists Justices in forming more objective opinions that are less influenced by their 
own political leanings. The test was created by the Court of a need to make better decisions when 
deciding Establishment Clause cases. Despite its value in Establishment Clause cases, it has not 
escaped criticism or attempts to remove its use completely from the Court. Critics of the Lemon 
test have unsuccessfully reduced the importance of Lemon, yet Justices have decided to try and 
rule Establishment Clause cases without using it. 
Lastly, the sheer volume of work the Justices are responsible for makes utilizing a test 
essential for providing correct opinions on cases. Data has shown that when the Lemon test is in 
use, the Supreme Court has ruled consistently concerning Establishment Clause cases. A test also 
helps to remove political opinions that can arise among Justices when deciding cases by declaring 
a clear set of principles that reflect the words of the Constitution. It also helps Justices make correct 
decisions despite the limits of the human brain. Justices are not computers that can make precise 
calculations without corruption, they are people that are influenced by forces in and outside of the 
Court room.  
The precedent set by the Lemon test continues to indirectly influence the Supreme Court 
to this day. When in use, the test has the ability to correctly determine violations of the Clause 
without the need for other tests. It provides a clear and concise method for Justices to use without 
relying on political leanings or limitations of the Justices. The perceived short comings of decisions 
regarding the Clause do not lie with the Test but rather with the Justices. By abandoning a 
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structured way to rule on Establishment Clause cases, the Court risks undermining the principles 
set by the Founding Fathers and eroding the wall between church and state further. 
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